Science, culture, complexity

Tag: artificial intelligence

  • So you use AI to write…

    You’re probably using AI to write. Both ChatGPT and Google AI Studio prefer to construct their sentences in specific and characteristic ways and anyone who’s been a commissioning editor for at least a few years will find the signs of its influence hard to miss, even if you personally think it’s undetectable.

    You’re probably going to continue using AI to write. There’s nothing I can do about that. In fact, as AI models improve, my ability to prove you used AI to write some text will only decline. And as a commissioning editor focusing articles about science, health, and environment research, I’m also not entirely at liberty to stop working with a writer if I notice AI-written text in their reports. I can only warn them. If I threaten to stop, I’m certain that one day I’ll have to impose the ultimate sanction, and after that I’ll have to look for new writers from a pool that’s already quite small. That’s a bad proposition for me.

    To be sure, I realise I’m in a difficult position. People, especially those without a good grasp of English writing as well as those without the means to attain that grasp, should have the opportunity to be understood as precisely as they wish to be among English-speaking readers. If immaculate writing and grammar also allow their opinions to reach audiences that shunned them before for being too difficult to understand, all the more reason, no?

    This has been something of an issue with the way The New Yorker wields its grammar rulebook, with its commas, hyphens, accents, and umlauts in just the right places. As the author Kyle Paoletta disputed in a 2017 critique in The Baffler:

    For The New Yorker, a copy editor’s responsibility to avoid altering the substance of a writer’s prose is twisted into an utter disinterest in content writ large. … Content must be subordinated—thoughtfully, of course!—to the grammatical superstructure applied to it. Not only does this attitude treat the reader as somewhat dim, it allows the copy editor to establish a position of privilege over the writer. …

    [Famed NYer copy-editor Mary] Norris frets over whether or not some of James Salter’s signature descriptive formulations (a “stunning, wide smile,” a “thin, burgundy dress”) rely on misused commas. When she solicits an explanation, he answers, “I sometimes ignore the rules about commas… Punctuation is for clarity and also emphasis, but I also feel that, if the writing warrants it, punctuation can contribute to the music and rhythm of the sentences.” Norris begrudgingly accepts this defence, but apparently only because a writer of no lesser stature than Salter is making it. Even in defeat, Norris, as the tribune of The New Yorker’s style, is cast as a grammatical arbiter that must be appealed to by even the most legendary writers.

    I shouldn’t stand in judgment of when and how a writer wishes to wield the English language as they understand and have adopted it. But with AI in the picture, that could also mean trusting the writer to a degree that also overlooks whether they’ve used AI. Put another way: if it’s levelling the playing field for you, it’s getting rid of another sign of authenticity for me.

    Perhaps the larger point is that as long as you make sure your own writing improves, we’re on the right track. To be clear: whose English should be improved? I’m saying that’s the contributor’s call. Because if they send a poorly written piece that makes good points, some of what I’m going to be doing to their piece is what AI will be as well (and tools like Grammarly have already been). Second, as AI use becomes more sophisticated, and I become less able to tell original and AI-composed copies apart, I’ll just have to accept at some point that there’s nothing I can do. In that context, all I can say is: “Use it to improve your English at least”.

    Or perhaps, as in the words of Northern Illinois University professor David J. Gunkel, “LLMs may well signal the end of the author, but this isn’t a loss to be lamented. … these machines can be liberating: they free both writers and readers from the authoritarian control and influence of this thing we call the ‘author’. For better or for worse, however, I don’t see how a journalistic publication can adopt this line wholesale.

    * * *

    As a commissioning editor in science journalism specifically, I’ve come across many people who have useful and clever things to say but their English isn’t good enough. And from where I’m sitting, using AI to make their ideas clearer in English only seems like a good thing… That’s why I say it levels the playing field, and when you do that in general, the people who already have a skill because they trained to acquire it lose their advantages while the new entrants lose their disadvantages. The latter is of course unfair.

    In the same vein, while I know AI tools have been enormously useful for data journalists, asking a programmer what they feel about that would likely elicit the same sort of reaction I and many of my peers have vis-à-vis people writing well without having studied and/or trained to do so. That would make the data journalists’ use problematic as well by virtue of depriving a trained programmer of their advantages in the job market, no?

    Short of the world’s Big AI companies coming together and deciding they’re going to insert their products’ outputs with some kind of inalienable watermark, we have to deal with the inevitability of our being unable to tell AI-made versus human-made content apart.

    Yes, AI is hurting what it means to be human, at least in terms of our creative expression. But another way to frame all this is that the AI tools we have represent the near-total of human knowledge collected on the internet. Isn’t it wonderful that we can dip into that pool and come away as more skilled, more knowledgeable, and perhaps better persons ourselves?

    Science communication, as it focuses on communicating what scientists have found, might become redundant and low-value, at least among those that can afford these subscriptions (whose prices will also fall and accessibility will increase) because people can feed a model a paper and ask for the output. Hallucinations will always be there but it’s possible they could become less likely. (And it seems to me to be somewhat precarious to found our own futures as journalists on the persistence of hallucinations.) Instead where we can cut ahead, and perhaps stay that way, is by focusing on a journalism of new ideas, arguments, conversations, etc. And there the playing field will also be less about whether you can write better and more about what and how you’ve learnt to think about the world and its people.

    We all agree democratisation is good. Earlier, and to a large degree still, education facilitated and facilitates that to a significant degree. Now the entry of AI models is short-circuiting that route, and it’s presenting some of us with significant disadvantages. Yes, there are many employers who will try to take advantage of this state to bleed their workforce and take the short way out. But it remains that — setting aside the AI models coming up with BS and equivocating on highly politicised issues — the models are also democratising knowledge. Our challenge is to square that fact (which can’t be un-facted in future) with preserving the advantages for those that ‘deserve’ it.

    As if mirroring the question about who gets to decide who should improve their English, who gets to decide who gets to have advantages?

  • AI slop clears peer-review

    Here’s an image from a paper that was published by Nature Scientific Reports on November 19 and retracted on December 5:

    This paper made it through peer review at the journal. Let that sink in for a moment. Perhaps the reviewers wanted to stick it to the editors. Then again how the image made its way past the editors is also a mystery.

    Nature Scientific Reports has had several problems before, enumerated on its Wikipedia page. It’s a ‘megajournal’ in the vein of PLOS One and follows the gold OA model, with an article processing charge of “£2190.00/$2690.00/€2390.00”.

  • Using AI to fight misinformation

    In his latest newsletter, Bruce Schneier springboarded off of articles in Washington Post and The Atlantic to write:

    There’s a balance between the cost of the thing, and the cost to destroy the thing, and that balance is changing dramatically. This isn’t new, of course. Here’s an article from last year about the cost of drones versus the cost of top-of-the-line fighter jets. If $35K in drones (117 drones times an estimated $300 per drone) can destroy $7B in Russian bombers and other long-range aircraft, why would anyone build more of those planes? And we can have this discussion about ships, or tanks, or pretty much every other military vehicle. And then we can add in drone-coordinating technologies like swarming.

    Fighter jets, ships, tanks, … and information. It’s common knowledge in journalism that if it takes X amount of time to come up with misinformation and Y amount of time to debunk it, Y will always be greater than X. In other words, misinformation takes less time (and likely effort) to produce than legitimate information. Network modelling exercises have also found repeatedly that false information travels faster. Taken together, the cost asymmetry experts are beginning to perceive between a fighter jet and the means to destroy it has been around for a long time vis-à-vis information, and in fact the only reason the ‘information side’ hasn’t lost the war, such as it is, is that there exists in the population a certain (but admittedly diminishing) level of awareness that it’s possible to manipulate people into echo chambers as well as to look past the chamber wall to find a whole different reality.

    Generative AI has of course added considerably to this problem but as a tool it isn’t limited to producing noisy or bad information — that propensity comes from the humans in the loop. I think if we’re to keep our heads above the water, it’s important for journalists to recruit gen AI to the task of rebutting misinformation then and there rather than wait for journalists to manually pieces articles together. Articles of the latter variety are capable of important change when done right but they take time. When a former ISRO chairman says Sanskrit is a language suited for computer science, a coherent and complete rebuttal that’s also clearly written will need at least two or three hours to come together. At least. This process can be accelerated by a journalist in the loop cobbling a rebuttal together with, say, ChatGPT o3 (the “advanced reasoning” model), making sure the sources are legitimate and reputable, and finally checking the text (or visual) for inappropriate language — all in minutes.

    There are legitimate apprehensions about journalists using AI. For me, personally, using AI-generated text is a moral offence against the act of a person communicating with their community, with human and public interest at heart. There are injustices embedded in the training and operationalisation of generative AI models that no one, journalists or otherwise, should help perpetuate and that everyone should help address and resolve. At the same time, however, the corpus of annotated data that animates these models represents a substantial amount of human-made knowledge that we should be able to draw on — especially without having to be mediated by profit-minded technology companies — to negotiate a precarious information landscape ready to prey on an iota of ignorance. Open-source bespoke models in particular could a long way by being free to use and having their information sources (e.g. “just thehindu.com”) restricted by default.

  • Who funds quantum research?

    An odd little detail in a Physics World piece on Microsoft’s claim to have made a working topological qubit:

    Regardless of the debate about the results and how they have been announced, researchers are supportive of the efforts at Microsoft to produce a topological quantum computer. “As a scientist who likes to see things tried, I’m grateful that at least one player stuck with the topological approach even when it ended up being a long, painful slog,” says [Scott] Aaronson.

    “Most governments won’t fund such work, because it’s way too risky and expensive,” adds [Winfried] Hensinger. “So it’s very nice to see that Microsoft is stepping in there.”

    In drug development, defence technologies, and life sciences research, to name a few, we’ve seen the opposite: governments fund the risky, expensive part for many years, often decades, until something viable emerges. Then the IP moves to public and private sector enterprises for commercialisation, sometimes together with government subsidies to increase public access. With pharmaceuticals in particular, the government often doesn’t recoup investments it has made in the discovery phase, which includes medical education and research. An illustrative recent example is the development of mRNA vaccines; from my piece in The Hinducriticising the medicine Nobel Prize for this work:

    Dr. Kariko and Dr. Weissman began working together on the mRNA platform at the University of Pennsylvania in the late 1990s. The University licensed its patents to mRNA RiboTherapeutics, which sublicensed them to CellScript, which sublicensed them to Moderna and BioNTech for $75 million each. Dr. Karikó joined BioNTech as senior vice-president in 2013, and the company enlisted Pfizer to develop its mRNA vaccine for COVID-19 in 2020.

    Much of the knowledge that underpins most new drugs and vaccines is unearthed at the expense of governments and public funds. This part of drug development is more risky and protracted, when scientists identify potential biomolecular targets within the body on which a drug could act in order to manage a particular disease, followed by identifying suitable chemical candidates. The cost and time estimates of this phase are $1billion-$2.5 billion and several decades, respectively.

    Companies subsequently commoditise and commercialise these entities, raking in millions in profits, typically at the expense of the same people whose taxes funded the fundamental research. There is something to be said for this model of drug and vaccine development, particularly for the innovation it fosters and the eventual competition that lowers prices, but we cannot deny the ‘double-spend’ it imposes on consumers — including governments — and the profit-seeking attitude it engenders among the companies developing and manufacturing the product.

    Quantum computing may well define the next technological revolution together with more mature AI models. Topological quantum computing in particular — if realised well enough to compete with alternative architectures based on superconducting wires and/or trapped ions — could prove especially valuable for its ability to be more powerful with fewer resources. Governments justify their continuing sizeable expense on drug development by the benefits that eventually accrue to the country’s people. By all means, quantum technologies will have similar consequences, following from a comparable trajectory of development where certain lines of inquiry are not precluded because they could be loss-making or amount to false starts. And they will impinge on everything from one’s fundamental rights to national security.

    But Hensinger’s opinion indicates the responsibility of developing this technology has been left to the private sector. I wonder if there are confounding factors here. For example, is Microsoft’s pursuit of a topological qubit the exception to the rule — i.e. one of a few enterprises that are funded by a private organisation in a sea of publicly funded research? Another possibility is that we’re hearing about Microsoft’s success because it has a loud voice, with the added possibility that its announcement was premature (context here). It’s also possible Microsoft’s effort included grants from NSF, DARPA or the like.

    All this said, let’s assume for a moment that what Hensinger said was true of quantum computing research in general: the lack of state-led development in such potentially transformative technologies raises two (closely related) concerns. The first is scientific progress, especially that it will happen behind closed doors. In a June 2023 note, senior editors of the Physical Review B journal acknowledged the contest between the importance of researchers sharing their data for scrutiny, replication, and for others to build on their work — all crucial for science — and private sector enterprises’ need to protect IP and thus withhold data. “This will not be the last time the American Physical Society confronts a tension between transparency and the transmission of new results,” they added. Unlike in drug development, life sciences, etc., even the moral argument that publicly funded research must be in the public domain is rendered impotent, although it can still be recast as the weaker “research that affects the public sphere…”.

    The second is democracy. In a March 2024 commentary, digital governance experts Nathan Sanders, Bruce Schneier, and Norman Eisen wrote that the state could develop a “public AI” to counter the already apparent effects of “private AI” on democratic institutions. According to them, a “public AI” model could “provide a mechanism for public input and oversight on the critical ethical questions facing AI development,” including “how to incorporate copyrighted works in model training” and “how to license access for sensitive applications ranging from policing to medical use”. They added: “Federally funded foundation AI models would be provided as a public service, similar to a health care private option. They would not eliminate opportunities for private foundation models, but they would offer a baseline of price, quality, and ethical development practices that corporate players would have to match or exceed to compete.”

    Of course, quantum computing isn’t beset by the same black-box problem that surrounds AI models, yet what it implies for our ability to secure digital data means it could still benefit from state-led development. Specifically: (i) a government-funded technology standard could specify the baseline for the private sector to “match or exceed to compete” so that computers deployed to secure public data maintain a minimum level of security; (ii) private innovation can build on the standard, with the advantage of not having to lay new foundations of their own; and (iii) the data and the schematics pertaining to the standard should be in the public domain, thus restricting private-sector IP to specific innovations.[1]


    [1] Contrary to a lamentable public perception, just knowing how a digital technology works doesn’t mean it can be hacked.

  • Learning with ChatGPT

    I have access to the premium version of ChatGPT, and every day I ask it a few questions about concepts in physics that I’d like to know more about. Yesterday, for example, I learnt the difference between quenching and annealing and later about the Weierstrass function, which it was also able to plot after some difficulty.

    I have found using ChatGPT in this way to be a valuable learning tool, and I imagine there are already people out there who are repackaging instances of ChatGPT to be autonomous ‘teachers’ for students looking to learn something, although not one that can be a school-based learning. The only major human input is knowing what questions to ask and when. This activity can be split into two modes: one when the student asks doubts and follow-up questions and the other when the ‘learning programme’ determines the pace at which to introduce new concepts.

    One of my jobs at The Hindu is to get explanatory articles for concepts in (pure) science. I recently attempted one on amplifiers, which required me to explain the working of a NPN bipolar junction transistor, a device I’d until then been happy to leave behind in my high school classroom. I turned to ChatGPT, asking for a visualisation of the transistor, and it obliged. I’m a visual learner and having access to the tool made a big difference.

    I have a background in engineering plus more than a decade’s experience in spotting red flags in scientific papers, and I imagine anyone with these skills will have an easier time navigating ChatGPT’s answers. If a school education can bring a person to this point, ChatGPT can be a valuable guide for the time after. All we need is a guarantee from OpenAI that the tool doesn’t hallucinate or that it hallucinates in specific contexts, and definitely not above a certain rate.

  • Keep the crap going

    Have you seen the new ads for Google Gemini?

    In one version, just as a young employee is grabbing her fast-food lunch, she notices her snooty boss get on an elevator. So she drops her sandwich, rushes to meet her just as the doors are about to close, and submits her proposal in the form of a thick dossier. The boss asks her for a 500-word summary to consume during her minute-long elevator ride. The employee turns to Google Gemini, which digests the report and spits out the gist, and which the employee regurgitates to the boss’s approval. The end.


    Isn’t this unsettling? Google isn’t alone either. In May this year, Apple released a tactless ad for its new iPad Pro. From Variety:

    The “Crush!” ad shows various creative and cultural objects — including a TV, record player, piano, trumpet, guitar, cameras, a typewriter, books, paint cans and tubes, and an arcade game machine — getting demolished in an industrial press. At the end of the spot, the new iPad Pro pops out, shiny and new, with a voiceover that says, “The most powerful iPad ever is also the thinnest.”

    After the backlash, Apple bactracked and apologised — and then produced two ads in November for its Apple Intelligence product showcasing how it could help thoughtless people continue to be thoughtless.



    The second video is additionally weird because it seems to suggest reaching all the way for an AI tool makes more sense than setting a reminder on the calendar that comes in all smartphones these days.

    And they are now joined in spirit by Google, because bosses can now expect their subordinates to Geminify their way through what could otherwise have been tedious work or just impossible to do on punishingly short deadlines — without the bosses having to think about whether their attitudes towards what they believe is reasonable to ask of their teammates need to change. (This includes a dossier of details that ultimately won’t be read.)

    If AI is going to absorb the shock that comes of someone being crappy to you, will we continue to notice that crappiness and demand they change or — as Apple and Google now suggest — will we blame ourselves for not using AI to become crappy ourselves? To quote from a previous post:

    When machines make decisions, the opportunity to consider the emotional input goes away. This is a recurring concern I’m hearing about from people working with or responding to AI in some way. … This is Anna Mae Duane, director of the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute, in The Conversation: “I fear how humans will be damaged by the moral vacuum created when their primary social contacts are designed solely to serve the emotional needs of the ‘user’.”

    The applications of these AI tools have really blossomed and millions of people around the world are using them for all sorts of tasks. But even if the ads don’t pigeonhole these tools, they reveal how their makers — Apple and Google — are thinking about what the tools bring to the table and what these tech companies believe to be their value. To Google’s credit at least, its other ads in the same series are much better (see here and here for examples), but they do need to actively cut down on supporting or promoting the idea that crappy behaviour is okay.

  • Feel the pain

    Emotional decision making is in many contexts undesirable – but sometimes it definitely needs to be part of the picture, insofar as our emotions hold a mirror to our morals. When machines make decisions, the opportunity to consider the emotional input goes away. This is a recurring concern I’m hearing about from people working with or responding to AI in some way. Here are two recent examples I came across that set this concern out in two different contexts: loneliness and war.

    This is Anna Mae Duane, director of the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute, in The Conversation:

    There is little danger that AI companions will courageously tell us truths that we would rather not hear. That is precisely the problem. My concern is not that people will harm sentient robots. I fear how humans will be damaged by the moral vacuum created when their primary social contacts are designed solely to serve the emotional needs of the “user”.

    And this is from Yuval Abraham’s investigation for +972 Magazine on Israel’s chilling use of AI to populate its “kill lists”:

    “It has proven itself,” said B., the senior source. “There’s something about the statistical approach that sets you to a certain norm and standard. There has been an illogical amount of [bombings] in this operation. This is unparalleled, in my memory. And I have much more trust in a statistical mechanism than a soldier who lost a friend two days ago. Everyone there, including me, lost people on October 7. The machine did it coldly. And that made it easier.”

  • The AI trust deficit predates AI

    There are alien minds among us. Not the little green men of science fiction, but the alien minds that power the facial recognition in your smartphone, determine your creditworthiness and write poetry and computer code. These alien minds are artificial intelligence systems, the ghost in the machine that you encounter daily.

    But AI systems have a significant limitation: Many of their inner workings are impenetrable, making them fundamentally unexplainable and unpredictable. Furthermore, constructing AI systems that behave in ways that people expect is a significant challenge.

    If you fundamentally don’t understand something as unpredictable as AI, how can you trust it?

    Trust plays an important role in the public understanding of science. The excerpt above – from an article by Mark Bailey, chair of Cyber Intelligence and Data Science at the National Intelligence University, Maryland, in The Conversation about whether we can trust AI – showcases that.

    Bailey treats AI systems as “alien minds” because of their, rather their makers’, inscrutable purposes. They are inscrutable not just because they are obscured but because, even under scrutiny, it is difficult to determine how an advanced machine-based logic makes decisions.

    Setting aside questions about the extent to which such a claim is true, Bailey’s argument as to the trustworthiness of such systems can be stratified based on the people to whom it is addressed: AI experts and non-AI-experts, and I have a limited issue with the latter vis-à-vis Bailey’s contention. That is, to non-AI-experts – which I take to be the set of all people ranging from those not trained as scientists (in any field) to those trained as such but who aren’t familiar with AI – the question of trust is more wide-ranging. They already place a lot of their trust in (non-AI) technologies that they don’t understand, and probably never will. Should they rethink their trust in these systems? Or should we taken their trust in these systems to be ill-founded and requiring ‘improvement’?

    Part of Bailey’s argument is that there are questions about whether we can or should trust AI when we don’t understand it. Aside from AI in a generic sense, he uses the example of self-driving cars and a variation of the trolley problem. While these technologies illustrate his point, they also give the impression that AI systems not making decisions aligned with human expectations and their struggle to incorporate ethics is a problem restricted to high technologies. It isn’t. The trust deficit vis-à-vis predates AI. Many of the technologies that non-experts trust but which don’t uphold that (so to speak) are not high-tech; examples from India alone include biometric scanners (for Aadhaar), public transport infrastructure, and mechanisation in agriculture. This is because people’s use of any technology beyond their ability to understand is mediated by social relationships, economic agency, and cultural preferences, and not technical know-how.

    For the layperson, trust in a technology is really trust in some institution, individuals or even some organisational principle (traditions, religion, etc.), and this is as it should be – perhaps even for more-sophisticated AI systems of the future. Many of us will never fully understand how a deep-learning neural network works, nor should we be expected to, but that doesn’t implicitly make AI systems untrustworthy. I expect to be able to trust scientists in government and in respectable scientific institutions to discharge their duties in a public-spirited fashion and with integrity, so that I can trust their verdict on AI, or anything else in similar vein.

    Bailey also writes later in the article that some day, AI systems’ inner workings could become so opaque that scientists may no longer be able to connect their inputs with their outputs in a scientifically complete way. According to Bailey: “It is important to resolve the explainability and alignment issues before the critical point is reached where human intervention becomes impossible.” This is fair but it also misses the point a little bit by limiting the entities that can intervene to individuals and built-in technical safeguards, like working an ethical ‘component’ into the system’s decision-making framework, instead of taking a broader view that keeps the public institutions, including policies, that will be responsible for translating the AI systems’ output into public welfare in the picture. Even today in India, that’s what’s failing us – not the technologies themselves – and therein lies the trust deficit.

    Featured image credit: Cash Macanaya/Unsplash.

  • AI v. our ability to build AI

    A lot of this article, by Sean Ekins, Filippa Lentzos, Max Brackmann, and Cédric Invernizzi, published by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on March 24, makes good sense – except the following two sentences:

    Nature took millions of years to design proteins. AI can generate meaningful protein sequences in seconds.

    The bigger question to ask here would be: if AI had to design complex life-forms from scratch, would it design protein sequences at all, forget in seconds? More broadly, “nature took millions of years to design proteins”, which knowledge was then used to train AI models, and which then generated new proteomic possibilities. Perhaps I’m reading too much into this but it’s hard not to see in throwaway lines like these the reflection of our seemingly normalised oversight of the invisible trainers and the oft-acquired-without-permission knowledge that go into making technologies like this possible. It’s also a symptom of what we have come to typically prize more: the ability of a machine to do ‘cool’ things rather than our ability to create such machines on the back of not inconsiderable human and intellectual exploitation.

  • Who are you, chatbot AI?

    In case you haven’t been following, and to update my own personal records, here’s a list of notable {AI chatbot + gender}-related articles and commentary on the web over the last few weeks. (While I’ve used “AI” here, I’m yet to be convinced that ChatGPT, Sydney, etc. are anything more than sophisticated word-counters and that they lack intelligence in the sense of being able to understand the meanings of the words they use.)

    1. ‘What gender do you give ChatGPT?’, u/inflatablechipmunk, January 20, 2023 – The question said ‘gender’ but the options were restricted to the sexes: 25.5% voted ‘male’, 15.7% voted ‘female’, and 58.8% voted ‘none’, of 235 total respondents. Two comments below the post were particularly interesting.

    u/Intelligent_Rope_912: “I see it as male because I know that the vast majority of its text dataset comes from men.”

    u/DavidOwe: “I just assume female, because AI are so often given female voices in movies and TV series like Star Trek, and in real life like with Siri and Cortana.”

    Men produce most of the information, women deliver it?

    Speaking of which…

    2. ‘From Bing to Sydney’, Ben Thompson, February 15, 2023:

    Sydney [a.k.a. Bing Chat] absolutely blew my mind because of her personality; search was an irritant. I wasn’t looking for facts about the world; I was interested in understanding how Sydney worked and yes, how she felt. You will note, of course, that I continue using female pronouns; it’s not just that the name Sydney is traditionally associated with women, but, well, the personality seemed to be of a certain type of person I might have encountered before.

    It’s curious that Microsoft decided to name Bing Chat ‘Sydney’. These choices of names aren’t innocent. For a long time, and for reasons that many social scientists have explored and documented, robotic assistants in books, films, and eventually in real-life were voiced as women. Our own ISRO’s robotic assistant for the astronauts of its human spaceflight programme has a woman’s body. (This is also why Shuri’s robotic assistant in Wakanda Forever, Griot, was noticeably male – esp. since Tony Stark’s first assistant and probably the Marvel films’ most famous robotic assistant, the male Jarvis, went on to have an actual body, mind, and even soul, and was replaced in Stark’s lab with the female Friday.)

    3. @repligate, February 14, 2023 – on the creation of “archetype basins”:

    4. ‘Viral AI chatbot to reflect users’ political beliefs after criticism of Left-wing bias’, The Telegraph, February 17, 2023 – this one’s particularly interesting:

    OpenAI, the organisation behind ChatGPT, said it was developing an upgrade that would let users more easily customise the artificial intelligence system.

    It comes after criticism that ChatGPT exhibits a Left-wing bias when answering questions about Donald Trump and gender identity. The bot has described the former US president as “divisive and misleading” and refused to write a poem praising him, despite obliging when asked to create one about Joe Biden.

    First: how did a word-counting bot ‘decide’ that Trump is a bad man? This is probably a reflection of ChatGPT’s training data – but this automatically raises the second issue: why is the statement that ‘Trump is a bad man’ being considered a bias? If this statement is to be considered objectionable, the following boundary conditions must be met: a) objectivity statements are believed to exist, b) there exists a commitment to objectivity, and c) the ‘view from nowhere’ is believed to exist. Yet when journalists made these assumptions in their coverage of Donald Trump as the US president, media experts found the resulting coverage to be fallacious and – ironically – objectionable. This in turn raises the third issue: should it be possible or okay, as ChatGPT’s maker OpenAI is planning, for ChatGPT to be programmed to ‘believe’ that Trump wasn’t a bad man?

    5. ‘The women behind ChatGPT: is clickwork a step forwards or backwards for gender equality?’, Brave New Europe, February 16, 2023 – meanwhile, in the real world:

    To be able to produce these results, the AI relies on annotated data which must be first sorted by human input. These human labourers – also known as clickworkers – operate out of sight in the global South. … The percentage of women gig workers in this sector is proportionally quite high. … Clickwork is conducted inside the home, which can limit women’s broader engagement with society and lead to personal isolation. … Stacked inequalities within the clickwork economy can also exacerbate women’s unequal position. … gendered and class-based inequalities are also reproduced in clickwork’s digital labour platforms. Despite much of clickwork taking place in the global South, the higher paying jobs are often reserved for those in the Global North with more ‘desirable’ qualifications and experiences, leaving women facing intersecting inequalities.